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This paper studies the relevance of strategic trade effects in the environmental policy for the 
European electricity sector. The production, investment and trade of electricity are modelled 
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price regulation and Cournot competition. The model is used to examine the effect of the 
degree of competition on the state of the environment and to study the strategic trade effects 
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1.   INTRODUCTION  
 
Virtually all generation technologies have some negative impact on the environment. By far the 
most significant externality is air pollution. At present the most relevant and widespread form of 
European regulation is the application of technical emission standards prescribed by the 1988 
Large Combustion Plant Directive for SO2, NOx and TSP (LCPD). The proposal of a European 
CO2 tax has long been debated and no formal agreement has ever been reached.   
As elsewhere in the world, the European electricity sector is undergoing a substantial 
restructuring process. In 1996 a European Directive set goals and the modalities of the 
liberalisation and of the integration of the national electricity markets (Directive 96/92/EC). After 
2006, all consumers will be admitted to the market. Member States are required to allow access 
to their electricity sector by means of non-discriminatory pricing of electricity transmission, and 
by means of non-discriminatory procedures for construction of new generation capacity. The 
presence of very large producers in some European countries coupled with a sub-optimal 
international transmission capacity will most probably lead to monopolistic competition rather 
than perfect competition in the transition phase. 
In this paper we analyze the interaction between environmental policy and market liberalisation 
in Europe with a multi-country, dynamic partial equilibrium model for the European electricity 
market. We study two questions. First we try to assess what are the likely effects of the degree 
of competition on the state of the environment. Second we examine whether, in the imperfect 
competition case, it pays for a country to relax its environmental policy as predicted by the 
strategic trade literature.   
In section 2 we review the theoretical and applied literature. In section 3 we present our model. 
In section 4 we study the effect of the degree of competition on the state of the environment. In 
section 5 we study the effects of unilateral deviations of environmental policy. Section 6 
concludes.  
 The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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2.  NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INSIGHTS FROM THEORY  
A non-competitive market for electricity in Europe has important consequences for the way 
environmental policies can be implemented. 
Trade under oligopolistic competition is characterised by positive profits. This provides an 
incentive to national governments to help domestic firms earn higher profits in the international 
arena. To this purpose, indirect commitment devices may be used when explicit trade policies
4 
are forbidden by trade agreements. National environmental policies have a direct influence on 
production costs of firms. Given the objective differences in the environmental situation of each 
country, their strategic use cannot easily be detected and prohibited. Thus, environmental policy 
makes a good candidate for an indirect trade policy device. From this idea stems quite a large 
literature on the interaction between environmental policy and trade. The first applications are 
due to Barrett (1994) for environmental standards and Conrad (1993, 1995) for taxes. These 
studies show that, compared to first best policies based on the rule that equates marginal social 
benefit to marginal social cost, environmental policies chosen by governments in the Nash 
equilibrium are tougher under Bertrand competition and less stringent under Cournot 
competition.  
The theoretical models used in this strand of literature are in general very simple, with just two 
countries, one producer per country, homogeneous products, a single technology, domestic 
pollution and the whole output sold to a third country. Kennedy (1994) shows that including 
domestic consumers and transboundary pollution in the analysis compounds somehow the 
incentives of domestic governments to distort environmental policy. On one hand, governments 
would be happier if domestic consumers could be satisfied by foreign production: in presence of 
limited transboundary pollution, domestic damages would then decrease. On the other hand, 
governments are still interested in relaxing local environmental polices, thus expanding 
domestic market shares both for strategic reasons and because part of the resulting 
environmental damage would be shifted away by transboundary pollution. The overall incentive 
should be in general ambiguous, but in the specification chosen by Kennedy the second 
strategic effect prevails. 
Technology choice and capacity setting are particularly important for the electricity sector, 
because electricity can be generated using different technologies, each of them characterised 
by different costs and by different impacts on the environment. The available capacity of these 
technologies determines the response of the firms to environmental policy. Also, generation and 
transmission  capacity licensing can be powerful strategic instruments in the hands of the 
governments. 
                                                 
4  Brander and Spencer (1985) analyse the rent-shifting behaviour of two governments, which try to support their 
national producer in an international Cournot duopoly, by means of export subsidies. These subsidies act as devices The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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These issues have not  yet  been studied in a theoretical framework. However at least the 
generation capacity aspects and the differences in environmental impacts among technologies, 
are related to those studied in the literature on strategic innovation and the environment (for 
instance Ulph (1994) Ulph (1996), and Ulph and Ulph (1996). In these papers, a role analogous 
to the one of capacity investments is played by R&D expenditures. The first two papers consider 
respectively process and environmental (i.e. emission–reducing) R&D. The third paper 
considers them jointly, proving that they have the same distortionary effect on environmental 
policy. In general, however, it  remains ambiguous whether this will lead to environmental 
policies that are stricter or more lax than first best ones. Finally, the dynamic analysis by 
Feenstra (1998) considers explicitly the role of investments, but her analysis is confined to the 
case of a single technology.  
The theoretical literature shows that governments have indeed incentives to distort their 
environmental policies in an international oligopolistic market, but the magnitude and the 
direction of the incentives remain ambiguous. Moreover, theoretical models necessarily give an 
oversimplified depiction of the reality, and thus cannot capture all the complexity of the 
European electricity sector.  
 
3.  MODELLING ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
3.1.  Existing models 
In the empirical literature, we have either models considering environmental policy within a 
perfectly competitive European or American electricity market, or imperfectly competitive 
models of the electricity market where environmental policy plays no role. 
Examples of the first kind of models are Holster (1997) for the European market and Palmer et 
al. (2001) for the American market. The first model compares a combined CO2/Energy tax policy 
set by the European Commission with a CO2 tax set independently by a national government 
alone, finding the latter to be ineffective. The second model considers the interactions between 
the liberalisation of the American electricity market and two versions of a NOx emission cap 
(seasonal and annual). In particular they analyse the welfare impacts and cost effectiveness of 
these two policies under “limited restructuring”, whereby some States retain price regulation, 
and under “nationwide restructuring” whereby perfect competition is assumed for the whole 
                                                                                                                                               
that commit national producers to a certain level of output and hence to a higher market share than the one they 
would have achieved in a simple Cournot equilibrium. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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country. They find, unsurprisingly, that the annual cap under nationwide restructuring dominates 
the other scenarios where either liberalisation or environmental policy (or both) is incomplete
5. 
Some national electricity models explicitly include imperfect competition
6. For instance, Green 
and Newbery (1992) describe the deregulated English spot market. Their model does not 
consider investment decisions. Their aim is to assess whether the deregulation actually 
implemented in the United Kingdom in 90’s is preferable to a regulated setting. It turns out that 
either regulation or a more fragmented structure would be advisable, and that the duopolistic 
market engendered by the reform fails to attain the Bertrand outcome the British government 
expected. Kemfert (1999) presents a Cournot model of the German electricity market. She finds 
that such setting gives a more plausible representation of the German market than downright 
perfect competition. 
Wei and Smeers (1996, parts I and II) consider an imperfectly competitive electricity market for 
three  European Countries under alternative assumptions regarding short run price 
determination: either optimal spot pricing or second lowest marginal cost pricing. These studies 
have a two stage structure: first, a long run Cournot equilibrium in capacities is computed, then 
prices and output are determined according to the institutional assumptions regarding the short 
run price setting. Their representation of the European electricity market however is too sketchy 
to derive any policy conclusion, and they are mostly interested in demonstrating that their 
algorithm reaches a unique equilibrium. 
 The only model we are aware of that assesses the European environmental policy within an 
imperfect competition framework is Böhringer et al. (2001). They present a general equilibrium 
model for Germany and consider, like Holster (1997) a unilateral introduction of a CO2 tax. They 
find that the resulting shift towards less carbon-intensive industries is more pronounced under 
imperfect than under perfect competition, but their cost appraisal does not yield clear-cut 
results. They assume that market power in the electricity sector is rather limited, positioning de-
facto this paper at the borderline between perfect competition and oligopolistic competition 
analysis. Most importantly their representation  of oligopolistic behaviour relies on exogenous 
mark-ups rather than on an explicit game-theoretic model. 
 
3.2.  A simple description of our model 
 
We present here a simplified version of our model. A description of the full model is provided in 
Appendix A. In this Section we focus on the simple problem of two countries, labelled Home and 
                                                 
5  Welsch (1998) analyses the consequences of a phase-out of nuclear power generation in Germany within a perfect 
competition, general equilibrium m odel of the European economy. Although it is not directly concerned with 
environmental policy, Welsch (1998) shows that renouncing to the nuclear technology in Germany brings about a 
substantial increase in Germany’s CO2 emissions, and concludes that the rationale for such policy should be sought 
in politics rather than in economics. 
6 A survey of these models is provided by Smeers (1997). The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Foreign, that host each an electricity producer, and that are interconnected by two international 
transmission lines with fixed capacity  HF Q and  FH Q . The first line conveys electricity from the 
Home Country to the Foreign Country, the second line is used for electricity flowing in the 
opposite direction. Using the international transmission lines involves a cost of u Euro/MWh for 
the seller.  
Each producer can generate electricity by means of two technologies, a clean one (labelled c), 
and a dirty one (labelled d) available in capacities  , cd XX  and ,, cd YY  respectively in the Home 
and Foreign Country. Each unit of output from clean plants ( ) cc x y  emits  c e  tons of pollutant; 
each unit of output from dirty plants  ( ) dd x y  emits  d e  ( ) dc e>e  tons of pollutant. Electricity 
can be generated at a cost of  c c  Euro/MWh using the clean technology, and at a cost of  d c  
Euro/MWh using the dirty technology.  
We consider a three-stage game. In the  environmental policy stage, governments set their 
environmental policy. In the  investment stage, firms set their generation capacity for both 
technologies. In the production stage firms compete, taking as given their available capacity and 
the environmental policy. 
3.2.1.  The Production Stage  
In the production stage, firms minimise the cost of producing any output level  i Q , and choose 
how much to produce, and where to sell their production, in order to maximise their profits, for 
given capacity levels  , cd XX and  , cd YY. We assume that each country sells on the domestic 
market  ii Q  MWh and  ij Q  MWh on the rival country’s market, where  i,j=H,F and 
iiiij Q=Q+Q .  Firms are subject to environmental policies in the form of taxes per unit of 
emissions  HF t,t  (and/or emission standards  H e  and  F e ) respectively in the Home Country 
and in the Foreign Country.   
The cost function to be minimised by the Home firm is  
(,,)()
ccddccdd
HHHHHHHHHHHH CQtecxcxtexex =+++ , subject to: 
;
dd
HH xX £  
;
cc
HH xX £  
;
cd
HHH xxQ +‡ 
ccdd
HHHHH exexe +£ . 
We assume that the solution to this production problem can be represented by a function  The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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  , (,,,) HHHcd CQteXX  
 
Having allocated production efficiently between the two technologies, the two firms compete on 
the international market. Under Cournot competition, this means that each firm maximises its 
profits taking into account production and export decisions of its opponent. The profit function to 
be maximised by the Home firm is: 
(,,,,,,,,,)(,,,)(,,,,) HHHFFFHHHHFcdHHFFFHHHHcdHF QQQQteQuXXRQQQQCQteXXuQ P=--
 
subject to  HFHF QQ £ , and taking as given 
F Q  and  FH Q . 
A Cournot equilibrium  for this stage of the game, is a vector 
**** ,,,
HHFFFH QQQQ Øø ºß   such that 
** ,
HHF QQ Øø ºß  is a best response to 
** ,
FFH QQ Øø ºß  and vice versa, given 
,,,,,,,,,,.
cdcd




HFHFHFFHHHFF utteeQQXXXX P=P . 
3.2.2.   The Investment Stage 
In the investment stage, firms set the capacities of their plants taking as given t he 
environmental policies of the governments, in order to maximise profits for the corresponding 
Cournot equilibrium. In other words, in this stage firms commit to a generation capacity level 
that would put them in the best conditions to compete. In our numerical model, the commitment 
to an optimal level of investment will be characterised by the assumption of  open-loop 
strategies
7. 
The Home firm chooses  ,
cd





HFHFHFFHHHFFH utteeQQXXXXSX P=P- %  
where  ( ) ( ) ,
cd
HHH SXSXX =  is the investment cost. 
A  Nash equilibrium  for this stage of the game, is a vector 
**** ,,,
cdcd
HHFF XXXX Øø ºß   such that 
** ,
cd
HH XX Øø ºß  is a best response to 
** ,
cd
FF XX Øø ºß  and vice versa, given 
HFHFHFFH utteeQQ ,,,,,,. 
The ex-ante equilibrium pay-off for the Home Country is then  
** (,,,,,,)
HH HFHFHFFH utteeQQ P=P %% . 
 
                                                 
7  We prefer to focus on open-loop equilibria both because they are numerically more tractable, and because we intend 
to stress the commitment properties of investments. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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3.3.  The Environmental Policy Stage 
In the environmental policy stage, governments set their environmental policies in a non-
cooperative way. The Home government’s objective function is the sum of domestic consumer 
surplus (CS), domestic firms’ profits, and domestic tax revenues, minus domestic environmental 















The Foreign government has an analogous objective function. 
From the Trade and Environment literature, we expect that governments do not apply first best 
environmental policies. Instead, they would distort them in order to increase domestic welfare at 
the expense of the rival country
8.  
Governments face conflicting incentives stemming from the consumers’ surplus part of their 
objective function. Consumers’ surplus depends partly on electricity imports, and partly on 
domestic production. As pointed out by Kennedy (1994), in a Cournot setting, incrementing the 
import-dependent component of consumers’ surplus calls for more strict environmental policies, 
because this would favour the foreign producer and would allow domestic consumers to import 
more. On the other hand, incrementing domestic consumers’ surplus  by means of domestic 
production calls for less stringent environmental policies, because this favours the domestic 
producer. In our model, international trade is bounded by the capacity of international 
connection lines. This limits the amount of electricity that can be imported, and hence the 
incentive for the governments to set overly restrictive policies. We would then expect that the 
concern for the welfare of consumers would rather push the governments towards less strict 
environmental policies.  
The incentives to promote domestic profits are more straightforward. Each government would 
set less stringent environmental policies if this contributes to commit the national producer to 
lower production costs (without generating excessive environmental damages).  
In our simulations the environmental policy stage is not modelled in an extensive way. We 
content ourselves with evaluating unilateral deviations from first-best environmental policies, 
without characterising a full Nash equilibrium in the policy game.   
                                                 
8  Note that, in principle, if the jurisdiction over a line pertains to the country that receives the electricity, governments 
could use the access to the national grid as an extra trade policy tool. However, the Internal Market in Electricity 
Directive 96/62/EC explicitly calls for non-discriminatory access to national grids. Note that it does not require the 
existing transmission capacity to be expanded, only fair and transparent rules for accessing the national grids. In our 
model, this is taken into account by assuming a single price u for international transmission of electricity, and fixed 
transmission capacity.     The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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3.4.   Model implementation and Data Used 
The focus of the model is on the electricity sector of Belgium, the Netherlands, France and 
Germany, for a time horizon of 35 years.  
Whilst we intend to capture many of the differences among the four countries by means of 
country-specific data, we do take some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we assume that 
the shape of the demand functions and the way consumers allocate their purchases of 
electricity through sub-periods (peak, off-peak) do not depend on their place of residence. 
Moreover, in each country there is just one producer which can generate electric power using 
several plants. Whilst this is a realistic hypothesis for France and Belgium, where market 
concentration is very high, it amounts to a serious simplification of the Dutch and German 
electricity industry. At least three large generators can be found there. Our hypothesis of a 
single national producer means that they behave like a cartel. 
We also assume that fuel prices and relative growth rates are determined on the world market 
and are exogenous. Fuel prices are shown in Figure 1. Finally, given the unavailability of 
transmission cost data, we set transmission costs at 16.7 Euro/MWh for international lines and 
4.5 Euro/MWh for national lines. These assumptions are obtained by calibration of electricity 
prices in 2000. 
Producers have at their disposal the technologies described in Table  I. In a cost–minimizing 
framework, from Figure 1 and Table I, one would expect that coal and nuclear plants, given their 
low running costs to be used first, whereas gas turbines would be more likely used to cope with 
peak demand. As to investments in new capacity, we expect the relationship between 
investment on one hand and fuel and other variable costs on the other, to play a major role in 
the technology choices of the producers, with expensive units installed only if they guarantee 
low operation costs. We assume moreover that these unit production and investment costs are 
not influenced by the market regime. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure 1: Fuel prices  
The four countries remain very different from each other in several respects. In particular, the 
electricity demanded in 2000, the installed capacity for each technology in 2000, the external 
costs of each pollutant, the share of small consumers in total demand (and, consequently, 
average demand elasticity
9), the demand’s growth rates, and finally the pre-existing 
environmental policies are different in each country. For demand data, we draw upon the 
estimates used in the European Union Energy Outlook to 2020. 
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Table I: Power plant characteristics 
As a measure of the degree of noxiousness of different pollutants, we use the ExternE 
(European Commission (1999)) estimates of the external damages of air emissions. Given the 
linearity of our damage function, these estimates can be regarded as marginal damages. These 
estimates are reported in Table II along with other country-specific data, and are used as a base 
for the  ex-post welfare evaluation of the various scenarios examined. In most of our analysis, 
we consider only environmental damages caused by emissions of air pollutants and hence we 
disregard other external effects (e.g. accident risk for nuclear plants), because these damage 
estimates are very low in ExternE. For nuclear power they amount to about 4.2 Euro/MWh in 
Belgium, 7.2 Euro/MWh in the Netherlands, 5.2 Euro/Mwh in Germany, and only 2.5 Euro/MWh 
in France. These figures are one order of magnitude lower than those for coal under equivalent 
aggregation assumptions (65 Euro/MWh in Belgium, 55 Euro/MWh in the Netherlands, 55 
Euro/MWh in Germany, 68 Euro/MWh in France). 






























Old Coal   Coal  2.6  84  4101  6021  890  520  52  1428  2.1 
New Coal  Coal  2.32  82  2005  59  793  93  45  1444  1.9 
Nuclear 
Plant 
Nuclear  2.22  85          51  2530   
Old Gas 
Turbine 
nat. gas  3.57  0.9  1607  13  720    20  476  5.8 
Gas STAG 
turbine  
nat. gas  1.87  85  337  7  377    29  619  1.4 
Oil & Gas 
conventional 
Mix  2.38  84  1122  4284  643  476  30  646  1.7 
Gas turbine 
(kerosene) 
Kerosene 3.57  90  1735  1799  720  143  20  476  1.7 
Hydro power  Hydro  2.6  89          3  2375  1.7 





2.38  84  2142  823  643  95  30  646    
STAG for 
cogeneration  
nat. gas  2.61  80  470  9  526    25  836    The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Table II: Country-specific data
10. 
                                                 
10  Sources: European Commission, UNIPEDE, Oosterhuis et al., authors’ calculations and ExternE. The figures in 
brackets refer to gas plants. The estimate for CO2 emission damage refers only to a mid-low estimate of global 
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From Table  II, one notices that the modalities of electricity generation differ strongly among 
countries. For instance, France relies more heavily on nuclear generation than the other 
countries; gas powered plants are more widespread in the Netherlands, whereas the share of 
coal plants is still important in Germany. 
Finally, we assume different interconnection capacities between each pair of countries. Given 
the lack of available data, we derived our assumed capacities from the maximum monthly value 
of load flows between countries
11 and we increased those figures by 10%. These capacities are 
shown in Table  III. We assumed the same capacity for each flow direction, no constraints for 
domestic transmission, and no direct interconnection between France and the Netherlands
12.   
  Belgium  Germany  France  the Netherlands 
Belgium  + 8   1550  2000  1350 
Germany  1550  + 8   2600  3300 
France  2000  2600  + 8   0 
the Netherlands  1350  3300  0  + 8  
Table III: Capacity (MW) of international transmission lines  
3.5.   The Baseline   
We will use three alternative assumptions on market regime: Perfect Competition, Price 
Regulation for the whole time horizon and Cournot Competition. All scenarios have a common 
starting point: a regulated price in the period 2000-2004; after this period, each scenario then 
jumps to one of the three market regimes for the rest of the horizon. Instead of presenting each 
environmental scenario in each market regime in turn, we prefer to take the first two market 
regimes as alternative benchmarks and to focus directly on the differences between the Cournot 
outcome and these benchmarks in each scenario. 
                                                 
11 Load flows between countries at 3:00 and 11:00 a.m., as reported in the 1999 UCTE Statistical Yearbook. 
12  See Appendix A for a detailed description of transmission capacity constraints. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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In the Baseline we assume that the following environmental regulation is in place (see Table 4): 
Environmental Problem  Regulation assumed in Baseline 
NOx, TSP, SO2  Large Combustion Plant Directive (1988) implemented by 
member state under the form of national bubbles, the 
caps stay fixed for the whole horizon 
CO2  We assume that there is a damage of 18 Euro/ton for the 
period 2010-2034, a carbon tax CAN be introduced. 
Nuclear safety  We assume that the EU legislation on nuclear safety is 
observed  
Renewables   No minimum quota’s are imposed  
Table IV: Environmental regulation in the Baseline 
Compared to the benchmark there is only one environmental policy variable that will be 
changed: the unilateral tax on CO2 emissions in the electricity sector. We have assumed that 
there is a marginal damage of CO2 equal to 18 Euro/ton. This damage can be understood in two 
ways. First it can be seen as (discounted) climate change damage and second as the shadow 
cost of meeting the EU Kyoto obligation in Europe. Any CO2 reduction effort in the electricity 
sector comes down to a reduced call upon internationally traded carbon emission rights whose 
cost we fix at 18 Euro / ton. 
We will later on use unilateral CO2 tax deviations to evaluate the incentives for national 
governments to deviate from a uniform European CO2 tax in a Cournot equilibrium. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
  16 
4.  POLICY SIMULATIONS  
4.1.  Who Benefits from Imperfect Competition? 
Before examining environmental impacts it may be useful to compare briefly the three  market 
regimes. We compare the perfect competition outcome with the Cournot outcome in Table V. 
Our simulations confirm the traditional result that imperfect competition reduces aggregate 
welfare, and that the benefits stemming from monopoly profits and lower environmental 
damages are more than compensated by the decrease in consumers’ surplus.  
 
Bn Euro B D F NL TOTAL
Consumer Surplus -57.33 -375.03 -305.75 -77.80 -815.90
Producers Profits  18.40 114.67 99.02 18.64 250.73
Taxes  9.65 52.95 46.53 7.45 116.58
Damage SO2 -2.38 -69.62 -2.26 1.73 -72.52
Damage NOx -2.32 -84.74 -15.88 -0.15 -103.10
Damage CO2 -1.59 -34.70 -8.44 -1.45 -46.17
 Damage TSP -0.41 -14.67 -1.42 0.34 -16.16
Environmental Damages -6.70 -203.72 -28.00 0.47 -237.95
Environmental taxes 0 0 0 0 0
Social welfare -22.58 -3.69 -132.19 -52.18 -210.64
 
Table V: Baseline case. Difference between Cournot and Perfect Competition. 
Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro)
13 
Table V presents for the Baseline case, the cumulative welfare difference between the Cournot 
and the Perfect Competition outcomes. It includes consumer surplus of electricity consumers, 
producers profits, total tax revenues and revenues from CO2 taxes only, monetary damages of 
CO2, SO2, NOx and TSP emissions and their total value.  
From Table V one concludes that the most important welfare effect of Cournot Competition is 
the reduction in consumers’ surplus. Consumers under Cournot Competition pay prices that are 
on average
14 45% higher than regulated prices in 2000. The largest effects take place in the 
countries with the largest internal market, namely Germany and France. The main winners 
under Cournot Competition are of course the producers, whose profits increase considerably. 
Notice that profits are proportional to the size of the internal market of each country. This 
indicates that transmission capacity constraints provide strong local market powers to producers 
on their domestic markets. Not all the countries suffer to the same extent from imperfect 
competition. Germany has a rather dirty initial generation mix so that a reduction of domestic 
output gives large environmental benefits. 
                                                 
13 A negative sign means that the Perfect Competition case has a larger value. 
14 Weighted average prices, where market shares are used as weights. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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B D F NL TOTAL
Consumer Surplus -47.64 -309.27 -236.38 -62.62 -655.90
Producers' Profits 13.96 81.45 63.81 12.14 171.37
Taxes 5.56 22.40 15.94 1.57 45.47
Damage SO2 -2.37 -69.11 -1.44 1.63 -71.29
Damage Nox -2.32 -82.69 -13.55 -0.14 -98.70
Damage CO2 -1.55 -33.59 -7.29 -1.04 -43.47
Damage TSP -0.42 -14.45 -1.16 0.31 -15.72
Environmental Damages -6.65 -199.84 -23.44 0.76 -229.17
Environmental Taxes 0 0 0 0 0
Social Welfare -21.46 -5.58 -133.19 -49.67 -209.90  
Table VI: Baseline case. Difference between Cournot Competition and Price 
Regulation. Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro)
15 
Table  VI compares Cournot Competition with Price Regulation. We find the same kind of 
results
16 as in Table V but differences are a little less marked, because under Price Regulation 
national firms retain an important profit margin. Profits under Cournot Competition remain by far 
the highest of the three market regimes considered. 
Some international trade of electricity takes place in all market regimes. Given the strong 
similarity in trade patterns among regimes, we exemplify them by reporting only those under 
Cournot Competition in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Baseline case. Net trade flows under Cournot Competition 
                                                 
15 A negative sign means that the Price Regulation case has a larger value.   
16 The solver treats this case as a perfect competition model where the cost function has been shifted up. 
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Trade patterns are not very much affected by the kind of competition, and are particularly similar 
under Perfect Competition and Price Regulation. With the exception of France, trade balances 
are  slightly higher in magnitude under Perfect Competition. France and Germany are net 
exporters of electricity, while Belgium and the Netherlands are net importers. In fact, Germany 
and France have much larger available capacities in cheap base load technologies than 
Belgium and the Netherlands and are always able to export some of their production.  
 
4.2.  Does Imperfect Competition Help Meeting Environmental 
Targets? 
 
Given the partial equilibrium setting of our model, we must distinguish between targets clearly 
specified for the electricity sector, such as the Belgian and Dutch caps on SO2 and NOx 
emission, and targets specified for the whole national economy, such as CO2 targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol. For the second type of targets, we measure the reduction in total CO2 emissions 
in the electricity sector. 
From our computations it is clear that, whilst the Belgian and Dutch NOx emission constraints 
are always binding in the Baseline scenario under Perfect Competition, their stringency declines 
under Cournot Competition. In particular, actual Belgian NOx emissions are below the target in 
the period 2005-2019, whereas NOx emissions remain a binding constraint in the Netherlands in 
all periods but 2005-2009.  
Quite the opposite story happens for SO2 emissions. The SO2 constraint is never binding in both 
countries under Perfect Competition, but becomes binding for the Netherlands in three periods 
under Cournot Competition. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Cournot Competition brings about two effects that have a 
direct influence on the stringency of environmental policies: technology substitution and output 
reduction. Note that it is not granted that the first factor will lead to the adoption of less polluting 
technologies. In fact, from Table V one notices that environmental damages actually increase in 
the Netherlands under Cournot Competition. This is due to the fact that output reduction in this 
country mainly affects the investment in new nuclear, wind and gas plants (which have no or 
very low air emissions)  while the use of waste incinerators and kerosene plants actually 
increases. Given the higher prices prevailing under Cournot Competition, the Dutch generator 
has to invest less in new base-load capacity. It is more profitable to invest in plants more 
suitable for peak-load generation, such as waste incinerators and kerosene plants, which bring 
about substantial emissions. 
 The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure 3: Baseline scenario. Emission reductions in excess of the targets for SO2 and 
NOx under Cournot Competition 
 
Figure 4: Baseline scenario.+ European CO2 tax. Difference between CO2 emissions 
under Perfect versus Cournot Competition 
 
Turning to CO2 emissions, Figure 4 illustrates the differences in CO2 emissions between Perfect 
and Cournot Competition in the Baseline scenario to which we have added a CO2 tax. Figure 4 
shows that, over the whole time horizon considered, the CO2 tax achieves more substantial CO2 
emission reductions under Cournot Competition but this does not necessarily hold in each 
period and in each country. Compared to Cournot Competition, these emissions are slightly 
lower under Perfect Competition in Belgium from 2020 onwards, in the Netherlands between 
2010 and 2019, while France has substantially lower emissions under Perfect Competition 
starting from 2030. This is due to an effect similar to the one that we have noticed taking place 
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plants in this scenario under Cournot Competition, while it does invest in new nuclear capacity 
under Perfect Competition after 2025. 
B D F NL TOTAL
Consumers Surplus -57.88 -365.13 -287.82 -81.38 -792.21
Producers Profits  19.60 116.90 91.83 22.64 250.98
Taxes  10.03 44.24 39.36 10.96 104.60
Damage SO2 -2.48 -60.23 -1.81 0.44 -64.08
Damage NOx -2.35 -47.70 -3.51 -0.10 -53.67
Damage CO2 -0.91 -15.69 -2.20 -0.09 -18.89
Damage TSP -0.41 -10.58 -0.25 0.08 -11.16
Environmental Damages -6.15 -134.20 -7.78 0.32 -147.81
Environmental taxes -0.66 -10.66 -2.01 -0.06 -13.39
Social Welfare -22.09 -69.79 -148.85 -48.10 -288.83  
Table VII: Baseline scenario + European CO2 tax U-Kyoto Tax scenario. Difference 
between Cournot and Perfect Competition. Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro) 
B D F NL TOTAL
Consumer Surplus -49.34 -305.48 -226.01 -66.36 -647.19
Producers Profits  15.61 87.09 60.54 15.82 179.06
Taxes  6.26 16.86 12.36 4.68 40.17
Damage SO2 -2.45 -60.74 -1.63 0.59 -64.24
Damage NOx -2.34 -47.35 -2.60 -0.11 -52.38
Damage CO2 -0.90 -15.41 -1.67 -0.17 -18.15
Damage TSP -0.40 -10.62 -0.20 0.11 -11.12
Environmental Damages -6.10 -134.12 -6.10 0.41 -145.90
Environmental Taxes -0.65 -10.35 -1.52 -0.09 -12.61
Social Welfare -21.37 -67.41 -147.01 -46.28 -282.06  
Table VIII: Baseline scenario + CO2 tax. Difference between Cournot and Price 
Regulation. Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro) 
 
As to the welfare effects of a European Kyoto tax, consider Table  VII and Table  VIII. These 
tables present the same kind of results as in Table  V and Table  VI, respectively, under the 
hypothesis that a European tax on CO2 equal to half the (assumed) marginal damage of this 
pollutant (18 Euro/ton) is implemented in 2005-2009 and that a European tax on CO2 equal to 
the (assumed) full marginal damage is implemented from 2010 onwards. Comparing Table VII 
with Table  V one notices that the difference in welfare between the two market regimes 
increases with the implementation of a CO2 tax. This happens because correcting an externality 
unambiguously improves welfare under Perfect Competition. Under Cournot Competition, 
Pigouvian taxes should be coupled with a production subsidy in order to restore optimality. If The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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used alone, they result in extra deadweight losses because the existing imperfect competition 
distortions are aggravated
17. 
A similar argument explains what happens under Price Regulation. Comparing Table VII with 
Table VIII, one notices a slight decrease in the difference in welfare with respect to the Cournot 
case, when the comparison is drawn against price regulation instead of perfect competition. 
Under Price Regulation, firms have a small profit margin, and imposing a Pigouvian tax brings 
about a small deadweight loss
18. 
 
4.3.  Is there an Incentive for Individual Countries to Relax 
Their Environmental Policy as Predicted by the Strategic 
Trade Literature? 
 
In order to fully answer this question, one should in principle compute the Nash equilibrium of 
the game in which each country sets its environmental policies taking as given the 
environmental policies of the other countries
19. We do not take this option, both because it is 
computationally very demanding, and because, within the European Union, countries do not 
enjoy complete freedom in their environmental policy choices. The targets set in European 
Directives or in the international protocols heavily limit their strategy space. However, countries 
are given some leeway in the implementation of these targets. We ask ourselves, therefore, 
whether national governments would be interested in unilateral deviations from the CO2 tax set 
at the common marginal damage level (or opportunity cost level) of 18 Euro/ton. The results are 
shown in the following Figures and in the Tables presented in Appendix B
20. 
 
                                                 
17 The implementation of a CO2 tax also helps meeting the SO2 and NOx targets. From the comparison of Table V with 
Table VII, one notices that the decrease in damages from these pollutants is more pronounced in Belgium under a 
CO2 tax, whereas in  the Netherlands the increase in  SO2  damages is smaller. This happens because of the 
correlation between emission factors across technologies. A plant that emits significant amounts of CO2 is likely to 
have significant SO2 and NOx emissions as well. Therefore a policy aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, in absence of 
specific abatement technology, will lead to reduction in the emissions of other pollutants, through output reductions 
from the polluting plants. This holds both under Perfect and Cournot competition.  
18 Trade patterns are not very much affected by the presence of a CO2 tax. Since the implementation of a CO2 tax 
results in higher prices and lower demand, trade balances are slightly higher in magnitude in the Baseline scenario.  
19 Had we assumed perfect foresight also on the part of governments, we would expect that only a government that can 
foresee welfare gains for its country would engage in strategic environmental policy distortions. However, a common 
result in the Trade and Environment literature is that distortionary policies lead to a prisoner’s dilemma. In fact a 
country adopting a commitment device to support its national producer would gain with respect to a free-trade 
outcome if it were the only one to take such option, while a free-trade outcome is superior to the Nash equilibrium 
where all the countries pre-commit. A myopic perspective is hence more appropriate. 
20  In this section and in Appendix B we distinguish between “Social welfare only CO2”, which takes into account only 
CO2 damages in the damage function and  “Social Welfare”, which takes into account damages from all air 
pollutants. This distinction has been introduced to highlight the fact that, in the EU-Kyoto Tax scenarios, a CO2 tax 
also reduces other emissions and this has relevance for the incentives to deviate. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure 5a:   Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under Cournot 
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Figure 5b:   Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under Cournot 
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Figure 6a: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 6b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
Cournot competition only damages from CO2 included in welfare The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure 7a: Welfare effects of unilateral devi ations in France from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 7b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in France from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 8a: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in the Netherlands from CO2 tax 
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Figure 8b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in the Netherlands from CO2 tax 
under Cournot competition, only damages from CO2 included in welfare 
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Figure 9: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 10: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
Cournot competition: welfare components in detail 
 
Figure 5a shows the differences between the Cournot outcome under uniform taxes for the four 
countries and the Cournot equilibria where Belgium unilaterally reduces its CO2 tax by 10% at 
the time, while in the other countries the tax is kept constant, when damages from all pollutant 
are taken into account in the welfare function, while in Figure 5b only CO2 damages are taken 
into account. Figures 6a, 6b to 8a, 8b show the same kind of results for Germany, France and 
the Netherlands. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the detailed effects on welfare components for The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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selected deviations in Belgium and Germany. More detailed tables for the four countries are 
provided in Appendix B. 
Two facts are clear from  these results. First, incentives to deviate depend on which 
environmental damages are included in the welfare function of the governments. Second, some 
countries may welcome unilateral deviations on the parts of their rival.   
As to the first point, notice that if only CO2 damages are taken into account (Figures 5b, 6b, 7b 
and 8b), each of the four countries would welcome any unilateral reduction of its own tax. 
However, when the damages of all pollutants are included in the welfare function (Figures 5a, 
6a, 7a and 8a), only the Netherlands would still find it always profitable to deviate, Germany 
would never find it profitable, Belgium would welcome a reduction if it is at least 50%, France 
would consider either small reductions (up to 20%) or very large reductions (at least 60%). This 
uneven result  is explained by  the differences in marginal damages of SO2, NOx a nd TSP 
emissions across countries, and in the technologies adopted. Germany pollutes more and 
values the damages from these three pollutants more than  the Netherlands. Given the 
correlation among CO2 and the other atmospheric pollutants, reducing the CO2 tax has harsher 
consequences in Germany than in the Netherlands. Moreover, the main effect of modifications 
in the CO2 tax in a country is that either the output levels of operating plants are affected or, for 
large modifications, the merit order of the plants in that country changes accordingly. This 
implies that welfare effects of unilateral deviations can be discontinuous, reflecting the switch 
from less polluting to more polluting plants. This could also explain the non-monotonic pattern of 
social welfare in Belgium and France. As long as operating plant output is expanded as a 
response to mild reductions in domestic CO2 taxes, the welfare trade-off is limited to output (and 
hence domestic surplus) expansion versus increased emissions (and hence, domestic 
damages)  from the same plants. For more substantial reductions, the producer may find it 
profitable to switch production to dirtier plants with considerably lower operating cost, and the 
resulting increase in profits and consumers’ surplus may well compensate the increase in 
environmental damages, especially if their marginal value is not too high.  
In some instances countries can benefit from unilateral deviations on the part of their rivals. This 
can happen for two main reasons. Consumers benefit from cheaper imports, and domestic 
emissions fall as a consequence of the reduction of domestic production. This is Kennedy’s 
(1994)  “pollution shifting” effect. In our simulations, this effect is prevailing, for instance, in 
Belgium as a consequence of unilateral reductions of 10, 30 and 40% in France’s CO2 tax. More 
often however, fiercer competition from the deviating country reduces welfare in rival countries, 
both because of the fall in national producers’ profits, and because the rival producers are 
forced to adopt dirtier technology to sustain competition, in a sort of a race to the bottom. 
A unilateral tax reduction not always induces a fall in the profits of the rival countries (in fact this 
happens consistently in our simulations only for unilateral deviations in Germany, as shown in 
Figure 10). Given the discrete nature of technology adoption decisions, and the different 
transmission capacities of international lines, if a non-deviating country loses market share on a The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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given market as a consequence of a tax reduction in another country, it is not granted that the 
deviating country would be able to cover it fully. Then some other country could be in a position 
to satisfy the residual demand, thus expanding its own market share and its profits.  
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we used a dynamic numerical model to assess the importance of the degree of 
competition for the implementation of environmental policies within the European electricity 
sector. 
Our model compares three market regimes: the widely used perfect competition paradigm, a 
price regulated monopoly regime, and a multi-market Cournot model. The three market regimes 
have the same electricity transmission constraints. Our environmental policy focus has been on 
the stringency of environmental policies under imperfect versus perfect competition. Moreover, 
we examined the effects of unilateral distortions of a CO2 tax. 
Our simulations confirm that, even if environmental policy is not optimal, as it is clearly the case 
for the European electricity sector, perfect competition is clearly superior to Cournot competition 
when it comes to welfare comparisons. The price regulation regime stands in between the two, 
but quite close to the perfect competition outcome due to the low profit margin assumed. The 
higher profits and the lower environmental damages that result from Cournot competition fail to 
compensate for the huge losses in consumer surplus. In our framework, this result is reinforced 
by two factors. On  the  one hand, the limited international transmission c apacity leaves 
significant local market power to generators on their domestic markets. On the other hand, the 
decrease in output under imperfect competition is sometimes accompanied by a shift towards 
more polluting technologies, thus reducing the beneficial environmental effects of lower output 
levels.  
As a consequence, our results on the interaction between the market regime and environmental 
targets are mixed. Whilst the stringency of sulphur dioxide targets declines under Cournot 
competition, NOx targets become more difficult to reach under Cournot competition. As to CO2 
taxes, their implementation under Cournot competition leads to larger deadweight losses, and 
hence, the lower emission levels are reached at a higher social cost. Moreover, although overall 
CO2 emissions are higher under perfect competition, some countries actually experience higher 
CO2 levels in some years under Cournot competition.  
Our investigation on strategic incentives showed that the appeal of unilateral deviations  of 
environmental policy depends crucially on which kind of objective function the governments 
have and on  the  environmental policy is pursued for the other pollutants. If they take into 
account damages from all pollutants and that these pollutants are insufficiently regulated, the 
attractiveness of unilateral deviations declines sharply compared to the case in which they take 
only carbon emission damages into account or that the other pollutants are regulated optimally. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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An interesting and somewhat surprising collateral r esult is that some governments may 
welcome unilateral deviations on the part of their opponents. We singled out two factors that 
may explain this result. On one hand, Kennedy’s (1994) “pollution shifting” effect induces 
governments to welcome to a certain extent electricity imports because of the induced increase 
in consumers’ surplus and decrease in domestic emissions. On the other hand, in presence of 
transmission constraints and several technologies, a unilateral deviation may cause a rival to 
lose more  market share than the generator based in the deviating country is actually able to 
cover. Other producers may then jump in and cover the residual demand. 
Overall, our simulations suggest that it is worthwhile taking into consideration factors that may 
lead to preservation of market power, when evaluating environmental policies for the electricity 
sector 
However, our results require a number of qualifications. For one thing, the numerical model in 
its present form hinges on some strong hypotheses. 
In particular the values chosen for transmission costs, transmission capacities, marginal 
damages of emissions, CO2 tax rate, elasticity of demand, mark-ups on costs in 2000 are all 
based on educated guesses or, at best, adapted from studies not immune from uncertainties 
(such as, for instance, ExternE estimates for external damages).  
Moreover, some equations of the model are quite rough representations of the real constraints 
that they are supposed to depict. In particular, international electricity transmission flow 
equations disregard Kirkhoff’s laws, transboundary pollution is included only in the sense that 
CO2 marginal damages are the same everywhere, but no transboundary matrix for conventional 
pollutants has been included, and trade to countries other than the four included in the model is 
not considered, not even as residual trade. Our on-going research is directed to overcome 
these drawbacks and also to include other policy scenarios such as the recent Directive 
Proposal on renewable energy sources
21. Our preliminary results indicate that imposing 
renewable source quotas to European countries can involve serious welfare losses in absence 
of flexible implementation instruments. 
                                                 
21 Parliament and Council Directive Proposal No. 500PC0279 (10/05/2000) The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Appendix A :  Description of the Numerical Model 
Equation Section  1Our model considers the dynamic equilibrium for the electricity sector of four 
neighbouring European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany. The model 
is dynamic in the sense that the electricity market equilibrium is modelled for a long time horizon 
(2000-2034). Such a time span is sufficient to cover the long lifetimes that power production 
investments generally have, and hence the main differences between nuclear power generation 
and other technologies can be properly highlighted. Thus, a dynamic setting allows us to take 
into full consideration the consequences in terms of technology choice of the various policy 
scenarios we analyse. We assume that all agents have perfect foresight.  
Our model consists of: 
•  A supply module for electricity generation in each country; 
•  A demand module for electricity in each country; 
•  An environmental module describing external damages caused by electricity generation in 
each country; 
•  A regulatory module describing environmental targets binding for electricity generation in 
each country; 
•  A transmission module describing how electricity can be physically exchanged in the 
international market; 
We consider six sub-periods within a year (base, load, medium, shoulder, high, and peak) all 
having the same length across the four countries. In each country, a single electric utility 
supplies electricity to the national and international grids using the following technologies:  
NP  •  Nuclear power plants  KEROP  •  Kerosene turbines 
CP  •  Coal power plants   HYP  •  Hydro power turbines 
NCP  •  New coal power plants   WP  •  Wind turbines 
MIXP  •  Mixed fossil fuel power plants  WAP  •  Municipal waste incinerators 
GP  •  Gas turbines   CHP  •  Gas-based co-generation 
plants 
NGP  •   New gas turbines  (STAG)     
Table A.I: Generation technologies 
 
Consumers buy electricity from the municipal distribution company at a price per kWh. This tariff 
includes marginal costs (production, transport and distribution) and a rent that goes to the The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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municipal distributor. Under perfect competition, the share accruing to producers just covers 
their marginal costs. Hence, to represent a multi-nodal market equilibrium under perfect 
competition we use the minimisation of production costs for a given demand. For the algebraic 
representation of the behaviour of each agent, we will use the following conventions: 
SETS  PARAMETERS 
t  years   a  distribution of consumption across 
sub-periods 
v  vintage year   af    availability factor 
i  sub-periods within  a year  D   lifetime dummy 
n,m  nodes (countries: B, D, F, NL)  inv investment cost  
z       technologies  r  discount factor  
Em   emissions  (NOx, SO2, CO2, TSP)   dam emission damage (Euro/ton) 
  e   emission rate (ton/MWh) 
VARIABLES
22  PARAMETERS (continued) 
P  electricity price (Euro/MWh)  t  emission  tax (Euro/ton) 
P net producer surplus (Euro)  q  interconnection dummy 
Q consumption (MWh)  c generation cost (Euro/MWh) 
X  production (MW)  lgt length of sub-period (hours) 
I  investment  (MW)  tra    transport cost (Euro/MWh) 
Qb electricity transiting through Belgium   b weight of Consumers’ Surplus 
Qd electricity transiting through Germany   
The model is implemented numerically in three stages. 
First, a demand function is calibrated for a given demand level. Under perfect competition, 
producers behave as cost-minimising firms. Since competition sets prices equal to marginal 
costs, for a given demand producers minimise the total costs of electricity supply. We exploit 
this feature for the calibration of the demand function  ( ) n,tn,tn,tn,t P=a- bQ , where  n,t Q  is the 
total quantity sold at t node n during year t. For calibration, demand is exogenously fixed to the 
observed levels in 2000-2004, and to projected levels in subsequent periods. We have taken 
into account that what is observed in 2000-2004 is actually the result of price regulation policies 
by including a price margin per MWh in that year. 
                                                 
22 All variables are required to be non-negative. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Second, a benchmark perfect competition scenario, with p rice regulation in 2000, is computed 
by means of a welfare maximisation. We use the outcome for 2000 of this reference scenario as 
the common starting point for all our policy scenarios. 
Finally, we compute our policy scenarios. We compare outcomes under p erfect competition to 
outcomes under Cournot competition and price regulation. 
A number of constraints further define our problem, and are always present in the three stages 
described.  
Firstly


















￿￿                                              (A.1) 
Moreover, each electric producer must take into account capacity constraints for its power 
plants and reserve constraints for national grids, in order to assure enough supply of electricity 


















+D ￿                                                       (A.3) 
Equation (A.2) simply stipulates that output in any given year should never exceed the available 
capacity, determined by the investments made until that year. Equation (A.3) requires that the 
same capacity must be sufficient to cover demand in each period plus a reserve margin. 
Implicitly, it amounts to assuming that each country is in principle self-sufficient, and that trade 
occurs for comparative efficiency reasons.  
Existent environmental policies are taken into account in terms of unit emissions specifications 
of the plants and in the form of maximum allowed NOx and SO2 emissions from Dutch and 
Belgian plants. The latter are specified in the model by means of the following constraints: 
inemzntzinmtemnt
miz
lgteXe £ ￿￿￿ ,,,,,,,,,, for n=B,NL   and  2X em=SO,NO    (A.4) 
Finally, international electricity sales are constrained by the capacity and the shape of the grid. 
Since this is rather complex, we will now describe it in detail here. 
In order to understand how we model the international transmission of electricity, consider 
Figure A.1. As shown in the figure, we assume that there are direct interconnections between 
any couple of countries but the Netherlands and France, and that there are two separate lines 
                                                 
23 In what follows, production  z,i,n,m,t  X is indexed not only for the period and sub-period in which it is produced, the 
firm that produces it, the technology used for production, but also for the country where it is generated and the 
country where it is sent. This allows us to regard the sum of  z,i,n,m,t  X over m as production per unit of time in 
country n with technology z, and the sum of  z,i,n,m,t  X over  z as sales per unit of time of a firm based in n to 
country m. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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connecting any couple of interconnected countries, one for each flow direction. Therefore, 
electricity traded at any moment between  the Netherlands and France must be transmitted 
using the existing links connecting them with the other two countries, and using the 
transmission capacity not utilized in that moment for direct trade between countries directly 
interconnected. For instance, if the French producer sells  i,t X  MW to the Dutch market at time 
i of year t, this amount of electricity may reach its destination either passing through Germany or 
passing through Belgium, but only if at that moment there is enough transmission capacity on 
the links between France and Germany, Germany and the Netherlands, and/or between France 
and Belgium, Belgium and the Netherlands. Of course this also influences what can be directly 
traded between countries that have a direct interconnection. The actual capacity of these lines 
is then reduced by what is used in order to allow trade between the Netherlands and France. 
We take, however, some simplifying assumptions. In particular: 
•  All transmission lines entail the same transmission cost. This incidentally implies that 
the transmission cost between France and the Netherlands is double the cost between 
any two directly interconnected countries; 
•   Electricity follows the most direct path to any destination. Hence, we rule out the 
possibility that in order to go from France to  the Netherlands (and vice versa), 
electricity will use the Belgium-Germany line as well.  
 
Figure A.1: The international grid 
Let  n,m,i,t qb be the share of electricity that goes from country n to country m passing through 
Belgium, and let  n,m,i,t qd  be the share of electricity that goes from country n to country m 
passing through Germany. Formally, we then represent the structure of the international grid by 
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Xqbqd £+ ￿ ,,,,,,,,,, ; ziNLFtNLFitNLFit
z
Xqbqd £+ ￿          (A.5) 
Electricity sent from a country to another must not exceed the capacity of the international line, 
minus the electricity simultaneously transiting through that country and directed either to  the 
Netherlands or France: 
,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziBDtBDziDBtDB
zz
XYXY ££ ￿￿                                                      (A.6) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziNLBtNLBNLFitziBNLtBNLFNLit
zz
XYqbXYqb £-£- ￿￿                   (A.7) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziDFtDFNLFitziFDtFDFNLit
zz
XYqdXYqd £-£- ￿￿                      (A.8) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziNLDtNLDNLFitziDNLtDNLFNLit
zz
XYqdXYqd £-£- ￿￿                  (A.9) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziDFtDFNLFitziDNLtDNLFNLit
zz
XYqdXYqd £-£- ￿￿                   (A.10) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziBNLtBNLFNLitziBFtBFNLFit
zz
XYqbXYqb £-£- ￿￿                       (A.11) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;; ziFBtFBFNLitziBFtBFNLFit
zz
XYqbXYqb £-£- ￿￿                     (A.12) 
Finally, electricity traded between the two not interconnected countries (France and  the 
Netherlands), must equal the available transmission capacity connecting them to the other two 
countries minus the electricity otherwise traded using those lines: 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,; ziNLFtNLDNLBziDFtziBFtziNLDtziNLBt
zzzzz
XYYXXXX £+---- ￿￿￿￿￿ (A.13) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,. ziFNLtFDFBziFDtziFBtziDNLtziBNLt
zzzzz
XYYXXXX £+---- ￿￿￿￿￿    (A.14) 
We can now describe more precisely the three stages of our model. 
 Cost Minimisation  

















   (A.15) 
In order to calibrate the demand function, we consider the equilibrium reached when all the 
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subject to Equations (A.1)-(A.14) and to  ntnt QQ = . 
Perfect Competition Benchmark  
With the parameters of the demand function in hand, we can compute the perfect competition 
equilibrium. By definition, in such equilibrium the surplus of consumers and producers are 
maximised, taking prices as given. The perfect competition equilibrium can therefore be 













MAX                      (A.17)   














is the consumers surplus and where  n C  is defined in (A.15) .  
 
Policy Scenarios under Perfect and Cournot Competition 
In order to allow comparison among the results of our scenarios, we assume that for all of them 
the situation in 2000 is the outcome, for that year, of the benchmark model described in the 
previous section. We then run our simulations from 2005, keeping fixed the levels of all decision 
variables in 2000-2004. 
Under Perfect Competition, this amounts to solving problem (A.17) from 2005 onwards, subjects 
to the policy constraints defining each scenario.  
Suppose then that firms behave in a non-competitive way in the international electricity market. 
In any given year t, at each node m, consumers are prepared to pay for each MWh purchased a 





Œœ ºß ￿￿￿                             (A.18)           
We assume that producers use open-loop strategies. Each producer’s problem then boils down 













,,,,,,,, MAX-                    (A.19) 
subject to Equations (A.1)-(A.14) and given  z,i,-n,m,t X X,z,i,-n,m;t , z,-n,t I  and where  n C  is defined 
in (A.15).  The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Discounted total profits consist of the revenues at each node, minus production and 
transmission costs.  
Welfare Function of the Governments 
In evaluating the outcomes of the various scenarios considered in this paper, we  take the 
viewpoint of national governments. Each government will evaluate the consequences of 
environmental regulations using a Social Welfare function  n SW . This function encompasses 
the weighted sum of private surplus of consumers  n CS  and the producers’ surplus  n P , minus 
environmental damages  n DAM : 
nnnn SWCSDAM b =+P- .                                                            (A.20) 
Total emission damages  n DAM   take into account emission damages of all pollutants, 
evaluated using a linear damage function: 
nemzninzinmtemznt
temzim
DAMrdamlgtXe = ￿￿￿￿ ,,,,,,,,,,
,
                               (A.21)      
The parameter  em,z,n  dam  summarizes the characteristics of emissions of pollutant em  from a 
plant using technology z in country n
24. 
                                                 
24 Note that in this formulation, each government cares only about those environmental damages affecting its own 
territory. The presence of transboundary pollution makes this sub-optimal from an international point of view. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Appendix B : Welfare Effects of Unilateral Deviations from CO2 
Tax under Cournot Competition 
 
Table B.I: Belgium 
 
Table B.II: Germany  
 
Table B.III: France  
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   1.895 1.087 -0.413 -0.037 1.760 2.672 0.226 0.133 0.959 3.010 1.200 0.099
Producers' Profits  -0.247 0.537 -0.203 -0.129 -0.248 1.229 -0.294 -0.211 -0.145 2.836 -0.186 -0.206
Environmental Damages 8.103 2.103 -0.159 0.030 8.220 51.789 -0.395 0.068 7.289 44.511 -4.288 -0.015
Social welfare Only CO2 1.570 0.756 -0.916 -0.303 1.405 0.416 -0.311 -0.259 0.655 2.097 1.113 -0.291
Social Welfare -5.548 -1.163 -0.812 -0.283 -5.778 -41.290 0.000 -0.268 -5.805 -34.228 3.980 -0.234
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   1.803 5.653 0.322 0.162 -0.013 6.939 0.821 0.035 1.781 10.106 -0.297 0.104
Producers' Profits  -0.253 3.743 -0.369 -0.227 -0.080 5.865 -0.325 -0.203 -0.353 7.106 -0.439 -0.224
Taxes  0.887 4.944 -0.334 -0.133 -0.084 4.594 -0.150 -0.159 0.775 4.311 -0.562 -0.143
Environmental Damages 7.961 58.499 -0.095 0.067 0.000 48.509 -0.054 0.042 8.097 62.317 -0.173 0.070
Social welfare Only CO2 1.445 3.727 -0.348 -0.258 -0.177 7.414 0.360 -0.364 1.219 10.228 -1.247 -0.322
Social Welfare -5.524 -44.160 -0.287 -0.265 -0.178 -31.111 0.400 -0.370 -5.894 -40.794 -1.125 -0.332
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.147 -0.035 0.779 -0.062 0.539 -0.402 0.795 -0.072 0.078 -0.029 0.479 -0.032
Producers' Profits  -0.077 0.027 0.162 0.052 -0.142 0.387 0.214 0.024 -0.042 0.028 0.346 0.021
Taxes  -0.074 0.012 0.062 0.049 0.120 -0.109 -0.198 0.070 -0.039 0.020 -0.148 0.050
Environmental Damages -0.025 -0.058 0.080 -0.017 3.744 -8.317 0.372 -0.047 -0.009 0.005 2.192 -0.051
Social welfare Only CO2 0.024 0.008 0.979 0.029 0.163 0.698 0.810 -0.037 0.010 0.017 0.257 0.003
Social Welfare 0.021 0.063 0.922 0.055 -3.227 8.193 0.438 0.069 0.005 0.014 -1.515 0.090
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.123 0.010 0.989 -0.032 1.791 -0.743 0.739 0.019 0.132 0.059 2.204 -0.173
Producers' Profits  -0.070 -0.014 0.539 0.071 -0.220 -0.297 0.912 -0.166 -0.047 -0.087 0.893 0.121
Taxes  -0.059 -0.013 -0.156 0.116 0.910 -0.841 -0.167 -0.098 -0.021 -0.046 -0.147 0.094
Environmental Damages -0.011 -0.034 2.317 0.067 8.084 -4.331 2.240 0.054 0.006 0.158 2.799 -0.028
Social welfare Only CO2 0.008 -0.016 0.926 0.101 1.497 -1.461 0.958 -0.308 0.065 -0.100 2.359 0.034
Social Welfare 0.006 0.018 -0.944 0.087 -5.604 2.450 -0.756 -0.299 0.058 -0.231 0.150 0.072
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.171 -0.442 -0.064 -0.103 0.132 -0.739 -0.014 -0.006 1.214 -0.365 -0.264 -0.057
Producers' Profits  0.091 0.067 0.014 0.082 0.309 -0.639 -0.114 -0.014 0.147 0.310 0.126 -0.095
Taxes  0.010 -0.888 -0.017 0.089 0.084 -2.609 -0.141 0.032 0.273 -0.182 -0.058 -0.055
Environmental Damages 0.470 -14.168 -0.054 0.036 0.809 -20.962 -0.086 0.059 7.265 -9.282 -0.317 0.004
Social welfare Only CO2 0.177 0.011 -0.053 0.039 0.338 -2.106 -0.244 -0.037 0.744 0.595 -0.100 -0.259
Social Welfare -0.198 12.905 -0.013 0.032 -0.284 16.976 -0.182 -0.047 -5.631 9.044 0.121 -0.212
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.254 -1.202 1.210 -0.070 0.433 -0.836 0.934 -0.190 0.515 0.133 0.107 0.025
Producers' Profits  0.646 -0.386 0.086 -0.097 0.764 -1.146 0.047 0.040 0.919 0.044 -0.230 -0.202
Taxes  0.054 -1.405 0.138 -0.055 -0.009 -3.348 0.256 0.064 -0.041 -0.035 -0.386 -0.153
Environmental Damages 1.188 -12.516 -0.713 0.035 1.176 -19.924 0.075 0.074 1.271 -1.485 -0.508 0.012
Social welfare Only CO2 0.694 -1.846 1.612 -0.277 0.909 -3.278 1.224 -0.152 1.047 0.286 -0.339 -0.373
Social Welfare -0.234 9.523 2.147 -0.257 0.013 14.594 1.162 -0.161 0.121 1.626 -0.002 -0.342The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Table B.IV: the Netherlands  
 
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.011 -0.050 -0.007 0.068 -0.039 -0.007 0.009 0.116 -0.026 0.099 -0.002 0.072
Producers' Profits  -0.010 0.025 0.022 0.130 0.024 0.001 0.009 0.266 0.014 -0.057 -0.005 0.467
Taxes  -0.035 0.008 -0.057 -0.060 -0.011 -0.005 -0.067 -0.163 0.009 -0.031 -0.021 -0.239
Environmental Damages -0.011 -0.029 -0.342 0.040 -0.024 -0.054 -0.359 0.113 0.007 0.020 -0.070 0.131
Social welfare Only CO2 -0.006 -0.015 0.035 0.066 0.001 -0.006 0.031 0.111 -0.004 0.009 -0.012 0.173
Social Welfare -0.022 0.011 0.299 0.099 -0.001 0.043 0.310 0.105 -0.010 -0.010 0.043 0.168
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   -0.020 0.237 -0.015 0.100 0.025 0.220 -0.006 0.143 0.016 0.108 0.762 0.303
Producers' Profits  0.007 -0.112 -0.006 0.608 -0.023 -0.089 -0.004 0.744 -0.005 -0.109 -0.100 0.951
Taxes  0.003 1.916 -0.029 -0.369 -0.017 1.961 -0.008 -0.496 -0.030 -0.070 0.207 -0.469
Environmental Damages 0.000 15.736 -0.081 0.159 0.007 15.916 -0.004 0.176 -0.025 0.049 1.054 -0.019
Social welfare Only CO2 -0.010 0.078 -0.031 0.205 -0.015 0.102 -0.017 0.240 0.007 -0.081 0.730 0.444
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